Reading Material
Required Texts: Francesco Parisi, The Language of Law and Economics (Cambridge U. Press, 2013)
On-line Readings: SSRN Home Page:http://papers.ssrn.com/author=227722
Course Description
After a brief introduction to the methodology of law and economics, this course provides a brief introduction to the basic concepts of economic analysis for the study of law and legal institutions. The course covers several areas of law.
Requirements
The course grade will be assigned on the basis of an exam/paper. Knowledge of the assigned concepts and definitions will be fundamental for the satisfactory completion of the course requirements.
Class Schedule and Assignments
See posted class schedule and classroom assignment.
Topic I The Economic Approach to Law: An Introduction
Readings:
Parisi (2013*), entries listed under “History of Law and Economics” and “Methodology and Welfare Analysis”
Parisi, “Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and Economics” European Journal of Law and Economics (2004) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=586641)
Topic II Theory of Incentives: Voluntary Relationships
Readings:
Parisi (2013*), entries listed under “Contract Theory and Mechanism Design” and “Economics of Contracts” Parisi-Luppi-Fon, Optimal Remedies for Bilateral Contracts (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020669)
Topic III Theory of Incentives: Involuntary Relationships
Readings:
Parisi (2013*), entries listed under “Economics of Torts” Dari Mattiacci-Parisi, “Tort Law: A Précis” Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2005) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=458701)
Parisi-Fon, “Comparative Causation,” American Law and Economics Review (2004) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=293575)
Topic IV Coase and the Economics of Legal Remedies
Readings:
Parisi (2013*), entries listed under “Theory of Market Failures” and “The Coase Theorem and Remedies” Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1-44 (1960)
Calabresi- Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,” 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128 (1972)
Topic V Models of Litigation and the Legal Evolution
Readings:
Parisi (2013*), entries listed under “Economics of Litigation and Enforcement”
Rubin, “Why is the Common Law Efficient,” 6 Journal of Legal Studies 51-63 (1977)
Priest, “The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules,” 6 Journal of Legal Studies 65-82 (1977)
Fon-Parisi-Depoorter, “Litigation, Judicial Path-Dependence and Legal Change” (http://ssrn.com/abstract=339460)
Topic VI Rent-Seeking Models
Readings:
Tullock, Gordon. 1967. “The Welfare Cost of Tariffs, Monopoly and Theft.” Western Economic Journal, 5: 224-232.
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, and Francesco Parisi. 2005. “Rents, Dissipation, and Lost Treasures: Rethinking Tullock's Paradox.” Public Choice, 124: 411-422. http://ssrn.com/abstract=467343
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, Sander Onderstal and Francesco Parisi. 2008. “Seeking Rents in the Shadow of Coase.” Public Choice, 139: 171-196. http://ssrn.com/abstract=913980
Topic VII Models of Lawmaking and Collective Decision-Making
Readings:
Parisi (2013*), entries listed under “Social Choice and Public Choice”
Tullock, Gordon. “Problems of Majority Voting,” Journal of Political Economy, 67 (1959), 571–9
Tullock, Gordon. “A Simple Algebraic Logrolling Model,” The American Economic Review, 60 (1970), 419–26.
Parisi, “Political Coase Theorem” Public Choice (2003) http://ssrn.com/abstract=262025
Luppi, Barbara and Parisi, Francesco, Politics With(Out) Coase (2011). International Review of Economics SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1943695