

STRUCTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT – SEHM²

Development of a comprehensive framework for technological scenarios triggered by natural events (Natech)

assessment in the chemical and process industries

Summary of yearly activities (a.y. 2018/19)

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ALMA MATER STODIOKOM – UNIVERSITÀ DI BOLOGNA E NON PUÒ ESSERE UTILIZZATO AL TERMINI DI LEGGE DA ALTRE PERSONE O PER FINI NON ISTITUZIONALI



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Introduction: Natech accidents





Natech accident





Natech features go beyond "conventional" technological accidents

- Multiplicity of simultaneous failures
- □ Cascading scenarios: elevated possibility of domino escalation
- Natural hazards may impact safety systems, utilities and lifelines
- □ Compound disasters: Emergency intervention may be hampered



Gap analysis: safety barriers and domino effect

Example: Flood Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

- QRA methodology for Natech accidents caused by floods (Antonioni et al., 2015).
- □ Vulnerability models for main equipment categories (Landucci et al., 2012, 2014)
- Similarity with domino effects, methodology for frequency of combined events (Cozzani et al., 2014)



- □ <u>Safety barriers?</u>
- Domino propagation?
- Utility systems?





Natural hazards and safety barriers





Past accident analysis



Hurricane Harvey (Texas, 2017)

- About 100 chemical releases. Power outage was experienced in many cases.
 Massive release from shutdown and emergency flaring. (*Misuri et al., 2019a*)
- Arkema peroxide plant was flooded. Power outage interrupted the refrigeration units. Inert gas system not available. Backup generators submerged. Violent explosions. Emergency intervention was hindered by floodwater. (CSB, 2018)

VItava River Flood (Czech Republic, 2002)

• Electrolysis plant was flooded. **Emergency retention sumps were flooded**. 80000t of chlorine were released in air and water. *(eMars)*

Koaceli Earthquake (Turkey, 1999)

• Multiple fires and chemical spills. Power outage: firefighting water was not available in many sites. Foam-water systems for vapor suppression were not available. Containment dikes were damaged. (Steinberg, Cruz, 2004)

San Jacinto River Flood (Texas, 1994)

 During flooding, 8 hydrocarbon pipelines ruptured, releasing LPG, gasoline, crude oil, diesel fuel and natural gas. Fire developed in multiple areas. Manual interruption valves were submerged. Operator intervention hampered. (NTSB, 1996)



Expert elicitation



Expert elicitation (Misuri et al., 2020):

- □ More than 40 experts involved
- □ Natural hazards: Floods and Earthquakes
- □ 16 safety barriers considered

Vulnerable systems highlighted

Floods

- Blanketing systems
- Fixed/semi-fixed foam systems
- WDS/water curtains/sprinklers
- Hydrants
- Fire and gas detectors
- Catch basins and bunds

Earthquakes

- Blanketing systems
- Rim-seal fire extinguishers
- Fixed/semi-fixed foam systems
- WDS/water curtains/sprinklers
- Hydrants
- Fire and gas detectors
- SDVs
- Fire walls
- Blast walls
- Catch basins and bunds
- EBD line to flare



Barrier performance during natural hazards

- □ Active: $PFD = 1 + (\varphi 1)(1 PFD_0), \eta = \eta_0$
- **D** Passive: $\eta = (1 \varphi)\eta_0$



Event tree analysis (ETA)





Way forward: FMEA/FMECA



Systematic method to identify the ways in which an item might potentially fail, and the effects of the mode of failure (EN IEC 60812:2018)





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