Externalities, optimization and regulation in queues

A seminar by Moshe Haviv, Department of Statistics and Data Science and the Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

  • Date: 02 OCTOBER 2019  from 9:30 to 12:30

  • Event location: School of Engineering, Sala del Consiglio (2nd floor historical building), viale del Risorgimento 2, Bologna

  • Type: Seminar

Abstract

The academic research on queues deals mostly with waiting.

Yet, the externalities,  namely the added waiting time an arrival inflicts on others, are of no less, if not of more, importance. The talk will deal mostly with how the analysis of  externalities leads to the socially optimal behavior, while solving queueing dilemmas such as whether or not to join a queue, when to arrive to a queue, or from which server to seek service at. Customers, being selfish, do not mind the externalities they impose on others.

We show how in queues too, internalizing the externalities leads to self regulation. In this setting selecting the service regime is one of the tools in one's arsenal. (Joint with Binyamin Oz)

About the speaker

Moshe Haviv holds a B.Sc. (1979) in mathematics from Tel Aviv University, and M.A. (1982) and Ph.D. (1983) in operations research from Yale University. He joined the department of statistics at  the Hebrew University in 1984 and with some intermissions, mostly at the University of British Columbia and at the University of Sydney, has been there since, currently as a Professor. 

He served as head of department there in 2008-2012. 

Moshe was the  president of the Operations Research Society of Israel in 2009-2012.

Contacts

Daniele Vigo

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