Public Management Seminars I - André Lino

ABSTRACT

In an increasingly interconnected and scrutinised public sector, accountability emerged as a central concept, usually related to the requirement that account-givers justify their actions to account-holders, who in turn assess compliance and impose sanctions and rewards. However, the dynamics of accountability, especially when multiple forums impose conflicting demands, remain understudied. Traditional research has focused on the consequences of conflicting demands within accountability frameworks; less attention has been given to the origins of these conflicts, specifically how political forces shape accountability mechanisms. This research addresses this gap by investigating the political incentives and power struggles that create and perpetuate conflictual accountability, by focusing on Brazil’s Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) as a case study. This research combines document analysis and 57 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, including public accountants, auditors, consultants, and government officials. Key findings highlight the design and implementation of Brazil's FRL were shaped by political compromises among stakeholders, including the National Treasury and Courts of Accounts. The law’s broad fiscal limits aimed at standardising accountability across government tiers but failed to resolve power asymmetries and divergent interests. Post-enactment, divergent interpretations of fiscal rules emerged, driven by competing institutional interests. Both account-givers and account-holders actively engage in shaping accountability processes; account-givers leverage political connections to influence interpretations, while account-holders use selective enforcement to align outcomes with their institutional goals. This paper advances the literature on accountability by emphasising its political dimensions. It argues that accountability forums are not neutral; they are battlegrounds where institutional actors negotiate power. The findings underscore the need for reforms that address conflicting incentives among account-holders.

BIO

André Lino is a Lecturer in Accounting at the University of Essex Business School and holds a PhD (accounting) from the University of Sao Paulo (Brazil). Lino’s main areas of interest are related to local governments. From financial distress and capacities for financial resilience to reforms related to public sector accounting standards and digital transformation. Another significant work stream relates to public sector auditing organisations at the regional and local level, and the co-production of public services and outcomes at the local level. He focus on qualitative methodologies and his work appears in refereed journals such as Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Financial Accountability & Management Journal and Public Money and Management. Lino is also Associate Editor for Public Administration of the Brazilian Business Review (BBR) journal.